This view contains identified evidence gaps.

System context

Where is the application boundary, who uses it, and which external systems interact with it?

The International Waste Shipments Service is the application boundary used here: a logical application family covering notification preparation, assessment, movement information and administration, rather than one confirmed deployed process. The chapters describe this broader scope; supplied evidence establishes MVC entry points, Web API composition and notification-related operations, but not their complete deployment topology. C01 C07 E0105 E0011 E0515

Read the model as three human user populations interacting with that boundary. “Internal” describes a user category, not a component inside the application: internal users are checked against competent-authority access, while external export-notification users are checked against ownership or sharing in the cited authorization implementations. E0182

Companies House and virus scanning are retained as referenced external or adjacent dependencies, without interaction relationships. Client registration, a company-name lookup page and a scanner endpoint establish relevant implementation surfaces, but do not establish an active, end-to-end external integration. E0510 E0520 E0523 E0412

Internal controllers, handlers, repositories and document-generation components are deliberately omitted as elements. The boundary is logical: database access is evidenced, but its deployed endpoint and operational ownership remain unresolved; IdentityServer middleware is reported within the API’s own OWIN application, so it is not automatically classified as an external identity system. E0173 E0011

All relationships below describe published source analysis or mocked controller expectations—not first-hand runtime verification. E0105 E0494 E0515

Diagram

flowchart LR
  nd52ddb28b7173df7dd75["International Waste Shipments Service #40;inferred#41;"]
  n803492047d58d8f19767["Notification owner"]
  n725617e8f7cb0719a6aa["Shared-access user"]
  n7fcc4f3f0082a5154097["Internal users and administrators"]
  n34093c7af92e5a80cfdc["Companies House"]
  n380f105e272778506089["Virus-scanning service #40;inferred#41;"]
  n803492047d58d8f19767 -.->|"Notification preparation and maintenance #40;inferred#41;"| nd52ddb28b7173df7dd75
  n725617e8f7cb0719a6aa -->|"Shared notification access"| nd52ddb28b7173df7dd75
  n7fcc4f3f0082a5154097 -->|"Regulatory and administrative work"| nd52ddb28b7173df7dd75

Elements

International Waste Shipments Service

Kind: application Basis: inferred Description: Logical boundary around the notification-management application family. It encompasses the evidenced web and API entry points and application-owned notification processing; this grouping does not assert that they share one deployment or process. C01 E0105 E0011 E0515 Evidence: C01 E0105 E0011 E0515

Notification owner

Kind: actor Basis: reported Description: External user associated with notification ownership. Controller evidence represents notification creation and editing workflows, while authorization evidence recognizes owners as an external export-notification access category. E0494 E0182 Evidence: E0494 E0182

Shared-access user

Kind: actor Basis: reported Description: External user granted access to an export notification through sharing. Sharing is represented in controller tests and notification-access authorization; the evidence does not establish identical permissions to the owner. E0494 E0182 Evidence: E0494 E0182

Internal users and administrators

Kind: actor Basis: reported Description: Users of administrative search, notification recording and account-administration surfaces. Internal notification access is checked against competent authority in the cited implementation; the full distinction between internal users and administrators is not established. E0515 E0519 E0182 Evidence: E0515 E0519 E0182

Companies House

Kind: external_system Basis: reported Description: Referenced company-information dependency represented by a configured Companies House client. The producer page requests a company name from an application action, but the supplied page evidence does not establish that action’s downstream external call. E0510 E0523 Evidence: E0510 E0523

Virus-scanning service

Kind: external_system Basis: inferred Description: Candidate adjacent service boundary: configuration can select local or client-based scanning, and a separate scanner API accepts file bytes. Its external placement relative to the logical IWS boundary and its active callers are unresolved. E0520 E0412 Evidence: E0520 E0412

Relationships

Notification preparation and maintenance

From: Notification owner To: International Waste Shipments Service Relation: interacts Basis: inferred Description: Owner-facing interaction is inferred from notification ownership authorization together with tested creation, producer, carrier and facility controller workflows. Those tests establish navigation and selected mediator calls under mocks, not successful production persistence. E0182 E0494 Evidence: E0182 E0494

Shared notification access

From: Shared-access user To: International Waste Shipments Service Relation: interacts Basis: reported Description: The cited export-notification authorization recognizes sharing as a basis for external-user access. Controller tests represent adding and removing shared users, but do not establish comprehensive endpoint enforcement or the complete shared-user operation set. E0182 E0494 Evidence: E0182 E0494

Regulatory and administrative work

From: Internal users and administrators To: International Waste Shipments Service Relation: interacts Basis: reported Description: Administrative controllers provide import/export notification search, notification creation and deletion requests, archival workflows and external-user administration. Supporting views expose assessment and movement navigation; exact permissions and successful downstream effects remain bounded by the supplied controller and view evidence. E0515 E0519 Evidence: E0515 E0519

Gaps

• Deployment boundary: Confirm which web, API, identity, scanner and database services are deployed together and who operates them. Provider configuration and middleware composition do not establish the complete production boundary. E0173 E0011 E0412
• Companies House integration: The chapter describes a Companies House lookup, but also explicitly leaves its downstream service boundary unresolved. Supply the lookup action, client implementation and environment configuration before adding an external interaction relationship. C07 E0523 E0510
• Scanner integration: Supply the selected scanner registration and actual upload-to-client call path. The local/client configuration alternative and scanner API do not prove that IWS invokes a separately deployed scanner. Preserve the API’s authenticated POST versus anonymous GET distinction when resolving that boundary. E0520 E0412
• Identity placement: Do not infer a separate external identity authority merely from OAuth clients or bearer-validation configuration. The API evidence reports co-hosted IdentityServer middleware; deployed request partitioning and authority configuration require follow-up. E0510 E0011
• Actor permissions: The complete owner, shared-user, internal-user and administrator permission matrix is unresolved. No separate movement-operator population or independent competent-authority system interaction is added solely from workflow names or authority data. C01 C07 E0182 E0459
• Email and other targets: Chapters reference email functionality, but the supplied API configuration specifies pickup-directory delivery rather than proven network SMTP fallback. External mail transport, document storage and other technical callers need concrete call-path and deployment evidence before inclusion as integrations. C02 E0011 E0457

Recovery limitations

• Some identified concepts have no supported connection.
• The view includes explicitly marked inference.

Sources

• C01 — SHA256 64f6d1401664e4822834ff5cc3e8dca458e7fb9abd7922a987008f5e7d194651
• C02 — SHA256 5f0242dead31d39b1254a75032bb6e91eb76df06330b351c7542819e8ed170b4
• C07 — SHA256 bdf9a0f39146dc7515eabe57974e583bf80f25a32ee16fc7327d96597b6a08ee
• E0011 — SHA256 08fada41c905cfd05613f4ccc1ac81e12e057e2de1976cf7788a4cabf6df2ca8
• E0105 — SHA256 12b62da8b7e9a99fadf1119260cb9fac7f4c9573127847ceed2eda7b4fd93cbb
• E0173 — SHA256 e52583c3a417dd5189ef0f3b9aeb1c84b0cfa29b659fa0f71d269f70f65f1630
• E0182 — SHA256 5d746af7496c1107dec94eb72c47a233f1d333b22050afdaad2914ec6212d427
• E0412 — SHA256 bec4c966bde1e268416b7b5b1a37f482349c2fad77bd40ef166b25e1dd647b58
• E0457 — SHA256 98f2f7867c866205f57b8712e268ff3ff5704e1533ff236617e4e4717c0a52aa
• E0459 — SHA256 74513b186450f1e0f23fa4f4aa555e8ca40940b76d6443502e2272f093824071
• E0494 — SHA256 5e75da157a930a3d220d22f0d49571bd5b87314257bd7e7cac060583b4a511d2
• E0510 — SHA256 2664b03966f4bb1abf42bd2eda4e9ceba87b6c6bbc8a90acbeadf144ba34d0af
• E0515 — SHA256 8fb5a6681128b5e1a60932728de42086c728430d5505c3d49718a247c5696d1f
• E0519 — SHA256 d55c33d7b3c3248b3a6cb566a7965fdef123b39751603773e90076c5367eb665
• E0520 — SHA256 a6466041fb1ea9a66a9b9615e373244c82681b7349e12eb1a26c821edf9f16d9
• E0523 — SHA256 5cf036666c2a4cec77945b33916a3c432dbc32da1ae4b6a7e86ca5b86d70fd7c